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Abstract 
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Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji 
1.  Introduction 
Just two years ago few economists would have predicted that the intra-eurozone payment 
system, Target2, would be elevated to the centre of attention in the discussions about the 
eurozone  crisis.  This  remarkable  feat  owes  much  to  a  series  of publications  by  Sinn  and 
Wollmershäuser,  who  revealed  how  large  ‘imbalances’  have  emerged  in  the  Target2 
payment  system  in  recent  years  whereby  some  countries,  in  particular  Germany,  have 
become large creditors in the system, while others, mainly peripheral countries, have become 
large  debtors  (see  Sinn  &  Wollmershäuser,  2012).  These  two  authors  have  made  two 
important claims: 
  First, the target system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits 
of  Southern  European  countries.  As  a  result,  these  countries  have  been  allowed  to 
escape the salutary discipline of the market, and have avoided taking the painful but 
necessary adjustment policies.  
  Secondly, Germany and a few other Northern European countries have been dragged 
into this scheme and been forced to provide credit to the deficit countries. The financial 
claims on Southern European countries that Germany has accumulated through the 
Target system have created unacceptably large risks for Germany if the eurozone were 
to disintegrate.  
These claims have been widely advertised in Germany and have contributed to creating a 
view in that country that the German taxpayer is likely to become the victim of a money 
machine that rewards the profligacy of Southern European countries. This view has led to 
strong negative emotions vis-à-vis the eurozone. It is therefore important to ask the question 
whether these claims are correct. It is our ambition to show that these claims are unfounded.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first analyze the sources of the recent surge of 
the Target balances in the eurozone (sections 2 to 4). This will allow us to study whether it is 
true that this recent surge has allowed sustaining current account surpluses and deficits. In a 
second part (section 5) we analyze the risks for Germany of the existence of this country’s 
large outstanding Target2 claims.  
2.  Target2 and current accounts: Description of the data 
By definition a country can accumulate target claims as a result of current account surpluses 
and/or  capital  inflows,  very  much  like  a  central  bank  in  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system 
acquires  international  reserves  as  a  result  of  current  account  surpluses  and/or  capital 
inflows. Conversely, countries that accumulate Target2 liabilities must have a combination of 2 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
current  account  deficits  and/or  capital  outflows.  In  this  section  we  present  the  data 
illustrating the sudden emergence of Target2 imbalances and compare these with the current 
account developments. For descriptions of the mechanics of the Target2 system, see Bindseil 
& König (2011), Dullien & Shieritz (2012) and Sinn & Wollmershäuser (2012).  
Figure 1 shows the target claims and liabilities of the eurozone countries. We observe the 
explosion of these claims (especially in Germany) and liabilities since 2008. How do these 
target  claims  and  liabilities  compare  with  current  accounts  of  the  eurozone  countries? In 
order  to  make such a  comparison,  it should  be  pointed  out  that  the  Target2  claims and 
liabilities are stocks, while the current accounts are flows. We therefore compare the changes 
in the claims and liabilities with the current account data.1 In addition we group together the 
countries with Target claims (called creditors) and the countries with Target liabilities (called 
debtors).  This  aggregation  allows us  to see  the broad  contours  of  a  possible  relationship 
between Target imbalances and current accounts. (In section 3 where we perform a statistical 
analysis we will return to the individual country data.)  
Figure 1. Target2 claims and liabilities in the eurozone 
 
Note: As explained by an ECB report in October 2011, the Target is measured as “net claims on the 
Eurosystem” minus the difference between “currency issued” (which represents an NCB’s share in 
banknote issuance based on its share in the ECB’s capital) and “currency put in circulation” (which is 
the actual amount of banknotes issued by an NCB). 
Data source: Datastream (IMF’s International Financial Statistics) and authors’ own calculations. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the results. In Figure 2 we present the current account surpluses and 
deficits (as a percent of GDP) of the eurozone countries, grouped into creditor and debtor 
countries. In Figure 3 the changes in the Target2 claims and liabilities (as a percent of GDP) 
of these two groups of countries are shown. The comparison of the two figures is instructive. 
                                                   
1 In the next section we will compare the claims and liabilities with the accumulated current account 
surpluses and deficits. The latter express the net foreign claims (liabilities) of a country and are thus 
comparable to the Target claims and liabilities.  WHAT GERMANY SHOULD FEAR MOST IS ITS OWN FEAR | 3 
 
Figure 2. Current account surplus/deficit GDP ratio 
 
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
 
Figure 3. Change in Target2 as a % of GDP 
 
Note  for  Figures  2  and  3:  The  current  accounts  and  Target2  changes  are  quarterly  data;  they  are 
therefore divided by the corresponding GDP of that quarter.  
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
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We  find,  first,  that  the  time  profile  of  the  current  account  imbalances  and  the  Target2 
imbalances are very different. While the former peak around 2008, the Target2 imbalances 
tend to peak at the very end of the period, i.e. after 2010. Note in particular that the current 
account deficits of the debtor countries declined from 4% of GDP in 2008 to 2.7% in 2011. 
Second,  the  volatility  of  the  target  imbalances  is  much  higher  than  the  volatility  of  the 
current account balances. The surges in the Target imbalances after 2010 are multiples of the 
current  account  imbalances.  This  suggests  that  the  short-term  movements  of  the  Target 
imbalances are dominated by speculative capital movements.  
Thus doubts can be expressed about the claim that the Target imbalances have been used to 
support  unsustainable  current  account  deficits.  These  Target  imbalances  became 
extraordinarily high when the current account imbalances were declining significantly.  
Since  this  analysis  is  based  on  aggregate  data  that  might  hide  individual  countries’ 
differences,  we  pursue  it  in  the  next  section  where  we  perform  an  econometric  exercise 
explaining the target claims and liabilities at the level of each individual country.  
3.  The causes of Target2 imbalances: Current account and capital flows  
In this and the following sections we systematically analyze the influence of current accounts 
and capital flows on the build-up of Target claims and liabilities at the individual country 
level.  As  the  Target  claims  and  liabilities  are  stocks,  we  first  compare  these  with  the 
accumulated current accounts of each country. It will be remembered that these accumulated 
current account balances express the net claims and liabilities of individual countries vis-à-
vis the rest of the world.  
In  Figure  4,  we  show  the  accumulated  current  account  positions  and  target  balances  of 
eurozone countries before the start of the financial crisis in 2008. On the vertical axis we 
present  the  net  Target2  claims  (liabilities)  of  these  countries;  on  the  horizontal  axis  the 
accumulated  current  account  positions.  The  observations  are  located  very  close  to  the 
horizontal  axis,  suggesting  that  there  is  no  relation  between  cumulative  current  account 
positions and Target balances in normal times. Things change significantly after 2008.  
Figure 4. Target2 GDP and accumulated current account GDP – pre-crisis 
 
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
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We  observe  from  Figure  5  that  after  that  year  Target  balances  surge  (negatively  or 
positively). Part of these surges seems to be related to changes in the cumulative current 
account  positions  (in  the  case  of  Greece,  and  to  a  certain  degree  in  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands). More importantly we observe surges (both positive and negative) that appear 
to be unrelated to changes in current account positions. This is spectacularly the case for 
Ireland, Belgium (negative surges) and Germany (positive surge). The case of Belgium is 
interesting as the large increases in Target2 liabilities coincided with a build-up of current 
account surpluses. This suggests that while the current account positions may have affected 
the target balances after 2008, most of the action appears to have come from another source. 
We identify this to be speculative capital movements triggered by fear and panic. 
Figure 5. Target2 GDP and accumulated current account GDP – post-crisis  
 
Note: GN indicates Germany and the Netherlands. 
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
 
How to test this hypothesis? When sovereign bond markets in the eurozone are gripped by 
fear  and  panic  (as  they  have  since  2008),  bondholders  sell  the  bonds  of  countries  they 
distrust and buy the bonds deemed safe. This has the effect of raising the government bond 
yields of the countries that are distrusted and lowers the bond yields of the safe countries. 
Thus the movements of the government bond yields can be used as indicators of movements 
of fear and panic (see De Grauwe & Ji, 2012). When such speculative movements arise, we 
are likely to observe imbalances in Target2. Sovereign debt crises tend to spill over into debt 
crises in general. Thus, for example when Spain was hit by a sovereign debt crisis, private 
Spanish debtors were also caught by the crisis, i.e. foreign creditors, say Germans, stopped 
rolling over their loans to Spanish financial institutions. These then turned to the Bank of 
Spain for funding, and the German creditors unloaded their claims onto the Bundesbank. 
Thus  in  times  of  fear  and  panic  both  the  spreads  between  the  debtor  and  the  creditor 
countries increase and the Target imbalances surge. In Appendix A we present a theoretical 
model that analyzes the link between the spreads and the Target2 balances. 
This  insight  suggests  a  procedure  to  test  whether  the  Target2  balances  are  related  to 
speculative capital flows. The way we will do this is to regress the Target2 imbalances on the 
government  bond  yields,  which  act  as  indicators  of  speculative  stress.  We  expect  that 
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countries that experience a surge in these yields (e.g. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy) also accumulate large Target2 liabilities, while countries that experience a decline in 
these yields accumulate large Target2 claims (Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). We 
will of course have to control for other variables, in particular the current account position, 
when performing these regressions.  
Before implementing the regression strategy it is useful to look at some more data (Figures 6 
and  7).  In  Figure  6  we  present  the  Target2  balances  (vertical  axis)  and  the  long-term 
government bond yield prior to 2008. We do not observe any clear relationship between 
these two variables. Figure 7 shows the same data for the period after 2008. We now observe 
a strong negative relationship, i.e. high government bond yields are associated with large 
Target2 liabilities, and low government bond yields with large Target2 claims.  
Figure 6. Pre-crisis Target2 and bond interest rates 
 
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
Figure 7. Post-crisis Target2 and bond interest rates 
 
Data source: Datastream and authors’ own calculations. 
-100
-50
0
50
0 5 10 15 20 25
Government long-term bond interest rate 
T
a
r
g
e
t
2
 
G
D
P
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
-100
-50
0
50
0 5 10 15 20 25
Government long-term bond interest rate (%)
T
a
r
g
e
t
2
 
G
D
P
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
%
)WHAT GERMANY SHOULD FEAR MOST IS ITS OWN FEAR | 7 
 
4.  Statistical implementation 
The previous analysis allows us to specify an econometric equation explaining the Target 
balances  by  the  accumulated  current  account  positions  and  our  indicator  of  speculative 
stress, the government bond yield. In addition we introduce a number of control variables. 
These are macroeconomic fundamentals that can affect the target balances.  
We then obtain the following equation: 
    =        +             +       +          +   +     
where     is the target balance of country i in quarter t (as a percent of GDP),       is the 
accumulated  current  account  surplus  (as  a  percent  of  GDP),           	is  the  10-year 
government bond yield of country i in quarter t and      is a vector of fundamental variables 
that  we  use  as  control  variables.  They  include  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  the  real  effective 
exchange rate and the growth rate of the economy. Countryi is the fixed country effect, c is 
the constant term and     is the error term.  
This specification of the econometric model leads to a statistical problem. It appears 
that the variables are non-stationary (see Table A1 in Appendix B where we report 
the  relevant  tests  for  unit  roots).  This  necessitates  estimating  the  model  in  first 
differences. We obtain the following equation.  
∆    = ∆      + ∆           + ∆     + ∆    
Note  that ∆CAS   is  the  current  account  surplus  or  deficit  (as  %  of  GDP).  The  result  of 
estimating this equation is shown in Table 1. It lends itself to the following interpretation. 
We observe that the government bond yield exhibits a strong and significant correlation with 
the  target  balances.  Thus,  countries  that  experience  increases  in  their  government  bond 
yields  also  accumulate  target  liabilities,  while  countries  that  experience  declines  in  their 
government  bond  yields  accumulate  target  claims.  This  confirms  out  hypothesis  that  the 
build-up of target imbalances is associated with speculative movements.  
We perform a Chow test using regression (2) in Table 1 to check for a structural break. We 
find  that  one  cannot  reject  that  there  is  a  structural  break  between  pre-  and  post-crisis 
periods  in  the  sample.  Therefore,  we  run  two  regressions  separately  and  the  results  are 
shown in columns (3) and (4). We note that the relationship between target imbalances and 
government bond yields is significant only since 2008, i.e. speculative surges in the bond 
yields  are  associated  with  increases  in  target  liabilities  of  countries  that  are  put  under 
pressure; countries experiencing declines in their government bond yields accumulate claims 
in  Target2.  By  contrast,  prior  to  the  crisis  there  is  no  such  relationship  between  target 
imbalances and bond yields. 
We  also  observe  that  the  current  account  has  no  significant  correlation  with  the  target 
balances. Among the fundamentals only the growth rate has a significant relationship with 
the target balances, i.e. an increase in the growth rate tends to be associated with an increase 
in the Target claims.  
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Table 1. First difference regression on Target2 GDP ratio 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  All   All  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
∆(interest rate)  -2.2349**  0.2557  0.2222  -2.7675** 
  (0.9406)  (0.2255)  (0.2027)  (1.2130) 
∆(debt GDP ratio)  -0.1065  -0.0881  0.1307  -0.1985 
  (0.0993)  (0.0934)  (0.0989)  (0.1229) 
∆(accumulated current account GDP ratio)  0.1010  0.0813  0.1458**  0.0598 
  (0.0803)  (0.0736)  (0.0631)  (0.0864) 
∆(real effective exchange rate)  0.1245  0.0576  0.0340  0.3020 
  (0.1055)  (0.0800)  (0.0850)  (0.1770) 
∆(growth rate)  0.3059**  -0.0279  0.0217  0.4170** 
  (0.1091)  (0.0486)  (0.0658)  (0.1845) 
∆(interest rate)*crisis    -2.9161**     
    (1.3079)     
∆(debt GDP ratio)*crisis    -0.0302     
    (0.0341)     
∆(accumulated current account GDP)*crisis    0.0002     
    (0.0225)     
∆(real effective exchange rate)*crisis    0.1980     
    (0.1235)     
∆(growth rate)*crisis    0.4878**     
    (0.1736)     
∆crisis     -7.0342     
    (9.9636)     
Cointegration  No    Yes  Yes 
Observations  440  440  253  187 
R2  0.099  0.121  0.064  0.135 
Cluster at country level and robust standard errors are shown in the brackets.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Notes:  1.  Chow  test  from  regression  (2)  shows  F  (6,  429)  =  1.79  and  Prob>F  =  0.0994.  At  10% 
significance level, we cannot reject “there is no structural break between pre- and post-crisis periods in 
the sample. 2. The cointegration tests are shown in Table A2 in Appendix B.  
 
Thus, the  results  reported  in  this  and  the previous  section  contradicts  the  claim  that  the 
Target system has been a mechanism that has allowed the financing of unsustainable current 
account  deficits  of  Southern  countries.  We  found  that  during  the  crisis  these  Target 
imbalances and capital movements were the joint results of movements of fear and panic in 
the eurozone. They were not mainly related to current account movements.  
To  check  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  also  ran  another  regression  by  replacing  the 
“accumulated current account GDP ratio” with “accumulated trade imbalance GDP ratio”. 
The former considers the current account of each country vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
while the latter measures trade imbalances (differences between exports and imports) vis-à-
vis the other eurozone members. Figure A5 (in Appendix C) shows the accumulated trade 
imbalance  as  a percent  of  GDP  of  each  eurozone  country.  The  surplus  countries  are  the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and Germany and the deficit countries are France, Austria, 
Luxemburg, Greece and Portugal. Table 2 shows the empirical results. Consistent with the 
previous  regressions,  we  find  no  significant  relationship  between  target  imbalances  and 
bond yields prior to the crisis, but since 2008 this relationship becomes significantly negative. WHAT GERMANY SHOULD FEAR MOST IS ITS OWN FEAR | 9 
 
However, we do not find any significant relationship between the target imbalances and the 
accumulated trade imbalances.  
Table 2. First difference regression on Target2 GDP ratio(robustness check with trade imbalance 
variable) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  All  All  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
∆ (interest rate)  -2.3671**  0.2477  0.2133  -2.8975** 
  (1.0172)  (0.2527)  (0.1986)  (1.2705) 
∆ (debt GDP ratio)   -0.1064  -0.0853  0.1082  -0.1921* 
  (0.0877)  (0.0853)  (0.0905)  (0.1058) 
∆  (accumulated  trade  imbalance  GDP 
ratio) 
-0.0250  -0.0271  0.1240  -0.0584 
  (0.1442)  (0.1221)  (0.0710)  (0.1611) 
∆ (real effective exchange rate)  0.1229  0.0657  -0.0022  0.2960* 
  (0.0999)  (0.0811)  (0.0755)  (0.1558) 
∆ (growth rate)  0.3161***  -0.0237  0.0286  0.4255** 
  (0.0996)  (0.0345)  (0.0616)  (0.1727) 
∆ (crisis*interest rate)    -3.0359**     
    (1.3000)     
∆ (crisis*debt GDP ratio)    -0.0326     
    (0.0417)     
∆  (crisis*accumulated  trade  imbalance 
GDP) 
  0.0004     
    (0.0262)     
∆ (crisis*real effective exchange rate)    0.1869     
    (0.1115)     
∆ (crisis*growth rate)    0.4930**     
    (0.1795)     
∆crisis    -5.3593     
    (10.0878)     
Cointegration  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Observations  440  440  253  187 
R2  0.096  0.119  0.070  0.136 
Cluster at country level and robust standard errors are shown in the brackets.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Chow test from regression (2) shows F (6, 429) = 1.9 and Prob>F = 0.0794. At 10% significance 
level, we cannot reject “there is no structural break between pre- and post-crisis periods in the sample. 
2. The cointegration tests are shown in Table A3 in Appendix B.  
5.  Do Target imbalances create risks for Germany? 
Our answer to this question is: no. The large accumulation of claims by Germany has created 
the fear that if the eurozone were to collapse, Germany would bear a large cost because the 
accumulated claims on the debtor countries of the eurozone would lose much of their value. 
This fear has become an important political factor in Germany. 
Before analyzing the nature of the risks underlying Target claims, it is important to relate 
these claims (and the liabilities) to each country’s GDP. This is done in Figure 8. It now 
appears that of the four countries with Target claims (Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands 
and Germany) Germany has the lowest level as a percent of GDP (24%). Luxembourg’s claim 
represents a whopping 278% of GDP (Finland: 40%, the Netherlands: 25%). Thus, if there are 
any risks, they are larger for the other creditor countries than for Germany. In this section we 
will  argue  that  the  fear  of  large  potential  losses  for  the  creditor  countries  is  vastly 
exaggerated.  10 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Our analysis of the risks that arise from accumulated Target claims proceeds in two steps. In 
the first step we make a distinction between the risks emerging from holding net foreign 
claims and target claims; in the second step, we analyze the risks that will emerge if the 
eurozone were to break down.  
Figure 8. Target claims and liabilities as a percent of GDP 
 
Data source:  Datastream  and  authors’  own  calculations.  The  values  of  Luxembourg  after  2009  Q2 
exceed 100%, so they are not included in the graphs.  
5.1  There is a difference between total foreign claims and Target claims of 
countries 
It is important to understand that if a country like Germany has net financial claims against 
the rest of the world, this can only occur because Germany has accumulated current account 
surpluses in the past. In addition, in any one year these net foreign claims can only increase 
if there is a current account surplus that year.  
If we apply these insights to the position of Germany in the eurozone, one can say that if 
Germany  has  net  claims  on  the  rest  of  the  eurozone  it  must  be  that  Germany  has 
accumulated current account surpluses against these countries in the past. There is no other 
way Germany can accumulate financial claims on the rest of the eurozone.  
These observations lead to the following insights. First, it is true that by holding large foreign 
claims, a country can take a risk. This risk will materialize when some of the foreign debtors 
default on their debt.  
Second, the Target2 claims of Germany are not a good indicator of this risk. Put differently, 
when in 2010 the Target2 claims started to increase dramatically, this did not change the risk 
Germany was facing. As we have made clear, the Target liabilities have increased mainly as 
a result of speculative flows. The latter do not change the net claims of Germany on the rest 
of the eurozone – only the composition of these claims and liabilities.  
Let us take an example to make this point clear. Suppose Spanish holders of euro deposits in 
Spanish banks feared an exit of Spain from the eurozone and decided to hold their euro 
deposits in a German bank. The result of this speculative flow is two-fold. 
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  First, it sets in motion the Target2 payment system. The transfer of deposits from a 
Spanish to a German bank has the effect that the Banco de España (which makes the 
transfer)  increases  its  Target2  liabilities  in  the  Eurosystem,  while  the  Bundesbank 
(which receives the transfer) increases its Target2 claims in the Eurosystem. 
  Second, the German bank (which acquires a reserve position at the Bundesbank) has an 
outstanding liability vis-à-vis a Spanish resident (a deposit). As a result, the net foreign 
claims of Germany are not affected by this speculative flow. The higher Target2 claim 
of the Bundesbank is offset by a higher liability of a German bank vis-à-vis a foreigner. 
Thus the increase in the Target2 claims of the Bundesbank should not be interpreted as 
an increase of foreign claims of Germany , and thus as an increase of risk from higher 
foreign exposure.  
Using the Target claims as a measure of risk incurred by the German population is therefore 
erroneous. As we have seen earlier, after 2010, the Target claims of Germany (and other 
Northern  countries)  increased  dramatically  and  much  more  than  the  current  account 
surpluses during this period. This increase in Target2 claims cannot be interpreted as an 
increase in the foreign exposure (net foreign claims) of Germany, except to the extent that 
they were the result of current account surpluses. What changed dramatically is the nature of 
these claims. Prior to 2010, these claims were mainly claims held by private German agents 
(mainly financial institutions). Similarly the liabilities of the peripheral countries were held 
by private agents (financial institutions). The eurozone crisis led to a dramatic shift. As a 
result of the breakdown of the interbank market, a large part of these private claims and 
liabilities were transformed into (public) Target claims and liabilities (Buiter et al., 2011), 
without  however  changing  the  total  net  foreign  claims  and  liabilities  of  these  countries. 
Thus, the explosion of the Target claims of Germany since 2010 cannot be interpreted as an 
explosion of the risk of foreign exposure for Germany. This risk increased moderately in this 
period because Germany continued to accumulate current account surpluses. It could have 
decided to reduce its current account surpluses but did not do so. As a result, the increase in 
the risk of foreign exposure was entirely the country’s own decision. It cannot be blamed on 
the Target system.  
One could argue, however, that because of the higher Bundesbank Target claims, it is the 
German taxpayer that now bears a higher risk. But this is also erroneous, which leads us to 
the second part of our answer.  
5.2  The Bundesbank can shift potential losses on its Target claims to non-
residents 
The idea that there are risks for German taxpayers that arise from the Target claims of the 
Bundesbank is based on a misunderstanding of what central banking is about. When the 
Bundesbank acquires claims (assets), it issues liabilities. The latter are called money base, 
and have the characteristics of legal tender. The mistake is to believe that the value of the 
money base (the central bank’s liabilities) is determined by the value of the assets held by the 
central bank. This is the underlying assumption of the assertion that if the eurozone were to 
collapse the value of the Bundesbank’s claims would decline leading to a loss for the German 
taxpayer.  This,  however,  is  an  erroneous  conclusion.  The  value  of  the  money  base  is 
exclusively determined by its purchasing power in terms of goods and services. This value is 
independent of the value of the assets held by the central bank. In fact in the fiat money 
system we live in, the central bank could literally destroy the assets without any effect on the 
value of the money base. In order to stabilize the value of the money base, the central bank 
should keep the right supply of money base, i.e. a supply that will maintain price stability. 
That is all that is needed. This condition is independent of the value of the assets held by the 
central bank (see also Whelan, 2012, on this).  12 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
The failure to understand the basics of central banking in a fiat money system is influenced 
by the fact that many economists still use the gold standard or a fixed exchange rate regime 
as  the  benchmark model  of  central  banks. In  these  regimes  the  central  bank  promises  to 
convert its liabilities into gold (in the gold standard model) or into foreign exchange (in the 
fixed exchange rate system) at a fixed price. Clearly such a promise can only be maintained if 
the relevant assets are on the balance sheet of the central bank. The ECB (and most central 
banks of large developed countries), however, has made no such promise. The value of its 
liabilities therefore is not dependent on the value of the assets it holds.  
Another  way  to  put  this  is  as  follows.  When  the  central  bank  acquires  assets,  mainly 
government  bonds,  it  issues  new  liabilities.  The  latter  take  the  place  of  the  government 
bonds in the portfolios of private agents. It is as if the government debt has disappeared. It 
has been replaced by central bank debt. The central bank could literally put the government 
bonds in the shredding machine. This would not affect the value of the central bank debt as 
the central bank has made no promise to redeem its debt (money base) into government 
bonds. And as long as the central bank maintains price stability, agents will willingly hold 
the new debt (money base) issued by the central bank.  
Thus, when the central bank acquires government debt (or any type of debt), it changes the 
nature  of  the  debt. It monetizes  the  previous  debt.  The  value  of  the  new  debt  will  then 
uniquely  be  determined  by  its purchasing power  value,  and  thus  by  the  capacity  of  the 
central bank to keep the issue of this new debt under control. If it manages to do this, its debt 
(money  base)  will  not  devalue. If  it  does not manage,  its  debt  will  decline  in  value  and 
holders of that debt will lose wealth. In this whole process the value of the assets held by the 
central bank is irrelevant.  
Let us apply these principles to a scenario of a break-up of the eurozone. If the eurozone 
ends,  central  banks  will  have  to  convert  the  outstanding  euros  into  the  new  national 
currency.  Let  us  consider  here  the  problem  of  the  Bundesbank  since,  as  many  German 
economists now fear, this conversion will lead to large losses for the Bundesbank and thus 
for the German taxpayer. This fear is misplaced. Suppose the Bundesbank announces that it 
will  convert  euro  banknotes  into  new  German  marks  at  the  rate  of  1  to  2  (1  euro  for  2 
German marks, which was the conversion rate at the start of the eurozone). It can do this 
perfectly, regardless of what is on its balance sheet. The only risk is that many non-residents 
may try to convert their euro banknotes in Germany, profiting from a conversion rate that is 
more attractive than the one on offer in their own countries. This risk could create a situation 
in which the Bundesbank is forced to convert so many euros into marks that the amount of 
marks in circulation after the conversion is too large to maintain price stability in Germany. 
In fact this is the only risk the Bundesbank faces, i.e. it may be put in a situation that it loses 
control over the issue of German marks. If that happens, inflation would set in and German 
residents would suffer losses. 
The Bundesbank, however, can avoid this risk by restricting the conversion of euros into 
marks to German residents. In doing so, it can be sure that the amount of marks created as a 
result of the conversion is such as to keep prices in Germany stable. Under those conditions, 
German taxpayers will not suffer one pfennig of losses.  
A similar restriction will also have to be applied to bank deposits held by non-residents in 
the German banking system. There is no doubt that prior to the collapse of the eurozone 
large speculative movements into deposits in German banks will be triggered. A conversion 
of these euro deposits into new German mark deposits would lead to an excessive increase 
in the German mark money stock and would risk creating inflation in Germany. A restricted 
conversion,  however,  can  ensure  that  this  does  not  happen,  thereby  shielding  German 
taxpayers from losses induced by the conversion. WHAT GERMANY SHOULD FEAR MOST IS ITS OWN FEAR | 13 
 
Somebody,  however,  will  lose  in such  a  conversion.  Indeed,  those  who  will  lose  are  not 
German taxpayers but the citizens of countries in the periphery. The reason is that the central 
banks of these countries are likely to apply a devalued conversion rate, i.e. they are likely to 
give back a lower amount of national currencies for one euro than the one applied at the start 
of the eurozone. And even if the central banks were to use the same conversion rate as the 
one prevailing at the start of the eurozone, it is likely that the new national currencies of 
these countries would depreciate sharply in the foreign exchange markets, leading to large 
losses for its holders.  
Thus, at conversion time, “justice will prevail”. The peripheral countries that have issued too 
much government debt in the past will be punished, i.e. their citizens will bear a loss of 
wealth resulting from a depreciated currency. The virtuous German taxpayer, however, does 
not have to share in this loss, provided the Bundesbank controls the conversion from euros 
to German marks and restricts this to German residents. The latter will inherit a stable new 
currency that will take the place of the old euro, which incidentally was also very stable in 
terms of purchasing power. By restricting the conversion of euros to German residents in this 
way, the Bundesbank can ensure that the losses that will occur as a result of excessive issue 
of debt in peripheral countries will also be borne by the residents of these countries, and not 
by the German taxpayer. Put differently, this restricted conversion is equivalent to pushing 
the devalued claims from the Bundesbank balance sheet back unto the balance sheets of the 
central banks of the debtor countries. 
Under those conditions, German taxpayers have no reason to fear the large losses that some 
German economists have gravely warned would be their fate if the eurozone were to come 
to an end (see also Whelan, 2012, on this point). 
It  is  surprising  that  these  simple  principles  are  not  widely  understood.  This  lack  of 
understanding of how modern monetary systems work has created an environment in which 
irrational fears could emerge. The problem is that these fears have become powerful political 
forces that make it difficult for governments to find rational solutions to the euro crisis.  
6.  Conclusion 
The  accumulation  of  large  imbalances  in  the  eurozone  payment  system  (Target2)  is  a 
dramatic  indicator  of  the  loss  of  confidence  in  the  euro.  Hans-Werner  Sinn  and  Timo 
Wollmershäuser are to be credited with drawing our attention to this development.  
That said, however, the first conclusion we reach in this paper is that two claims made by 
these authors are without merit. The first claim is that the Target payment system has been 
used  to  support  unsustainable  current  account  deficits  of  Southern  European  countries, 
which have allowed them to escape the discipline of the market, and have avoided taking the 
painful but necessary adjustment policies. We find no evidence for this claim. The build-up 
of  the  Target  claims  and  liabilities  is  almost  completely  unrelated  to  the  current  account 
developments. This build-up started at the moment when the current account deficits of the 
peripheral  countries  tended  to  decline.  The  recent  surge  in  the  claims  and  liabilities  can 
better be seen as the outcome of speculative fever that led investors to shift their portfolios 
away from what was perceived as risky assets into less risky assets.  
We also criticized a second claim made by Sinn & Wollmershäuser (2012), i.e. that as a result 
of Target2, Germany has been forced to provide credit to the deficit countries, and as a result 
has been pushed into a situation in which it had to take on unacceptably large risks that will 
lead to large losses for the German population if the eurozone were to disintegrate.  
This claim has received much attention in the German media and has contributed to creating 
fears  of  imminent  disaster.  The  claim,  however,  is  completely  unfounded.  First,  the 14 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
accumulation of a net foreign asset position of Germany is indeed a source of risk. But this 
accumulation could only occur because Germany accumulated current account surpluses. 
Since  these surpluses  are  the  result  of  policy  choices  of  that  country,  it  can  be said  that 
Germany has chosen to take these risks. Therefore Germans should stop complaining about 
these risks.  
Our second conclusion is that the net foreign asset position of Germany and its ensuing risk 
have little to do with the Target claims of that country. These have increased significantly 
without increasing the net foreign asset position of that country. As a result, these Target 
claims are a bad indicator of the risks Germany faces. 
Third and most importantly, the fear that Germany would lose much wealth because of the 
accumulated  Target  claims  if  the  eurozone  were  to  collapse  is  based  on  a  fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of money and central banking. We argued that the only risk 
faced by Germany is that if the eurozone were to collapse and the Bundesbank began to 
convert euros into new German marks, it be mis-led into issuing too many marks, thereby 
creating  inflation.  This  risk,  however,  can  be  eliminated  by  restricting  the  conversion  of 
euros into marks exclusively for German residents. In so doing, the Bundesbank will force 
the peripheral countries that have issued too much debt to pay the price of this policy by 
accepting devalued national currencies.  
Although  the  fear  that  Germany  would  incur  large  potential  losses  as  a  result  of  the 
accumulation of Target2 claims is unfounded, it has assumed the aura of reality in Germany. 
It has led to the view that any financial assistance will lead to losses for Germany, and given 
rise to great resistance towards providing financial assistance to peripheral countries. As a 
result,  this  fear  also  influences  political  attitudes  and  makes  it  difficult  for  the  German 
government to take a more lenient attitude vis-à-vis peripheral countries. Ultimately, this 
fear increases the risk of a breakdown of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, 
what Germany has to fear most is its own fear.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. The workings of the money markets under Target2 
In  this  annex,  we  develop  a  simple  two-country  model  that  illustrates  the  effects  of  the 
Target2 payment system on the money markets in a monetary union. As will be made clear, 
the model could as well be used for a fixed exchange rate system. This was done in De 
Grauwe (2009).  
We start by defining the demand and the supply for money in the two countries, called 
country A and country B.2  
 
In country A, we obtain: 
 
money demand: MDA = PALA( YA , rA)      (1) 
       
money supply: MSA = RA+ DA + TA      (2) 
 
where PA price level of country A, YA output, rA, interest rate , RA international reserves, DA 
credit to the domestic sector and TA is the net claim in the Target2 system. The latter can be 
positive or negative. If it is negative, we say that country A has a liability in the payment 
system. In this two-country model this is then a liability vis-à-vis country B. Thus in general 
when country A has a claim, i.e. TA > 0, country B must have a liability of equal size, i.e. TA = 
- TB  
 
Equilibrium in the money market of country A implies 
 
    MDA = MSA            (3) 
 
In country B, we obtain:  
 
money demand: MBD = PBLB( YB , rB)       (4) 
   
money supply: MSB = RB+ DB + TB      (5)     
     
where the variables are defined in the same way as in country A.  
 
Equilibrium in the money market of country B implies 
                                                   
2 Note that we do not make a distinction between money base and money stock. Put differently, we 
assume that the money multiplier is equal to 1. This makes the analysis simpler without changing its 
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    MDB = MSB            (6) 
 
Note that in the further analysis the variables RA and RB will not play a role. These variables 
typically play an important role in fixed exchange rate systems, as the central banks buy and 
sell foreign exchange so as to keep the exchange rate fixed. In this monetary union version of 
the model, the Target claims and liabilities take over the role played by the international 
reserve variables of the fixed exchange rate model.  
Let us start from the situation before the sovereign debt crisis. This is a situation where only 
one interest rate prevails, i.e. 
 
    rA = rB              (7) 
 
We can now represent the equilibrium of this system graphically as follows (see Figure A1). 
The  downward-sloping  curves  are  the  money  demand  curves.  The  money  supply  is 
represented by the vertical lines M1A and M1B. Money market equilibrium in both countries 
is  obtained  where  demand  and supply  intersect  (points  E  and  F).  In  addition,  given  the 
normal condition in the monetary union, the interest rates must be equal.  
Figure A1. Equilibrium in the money markets 
 
Let us now introduce a shock, which is the sovereign debt crisis. We assume that investors 
fear that the government of country A will have payment difficulties, which will have the 
following effects: as the government bonds of country A are sold, the interest rate on A-
bonds increases; the reverse occurs with the government bonds of country B that are bought, 
leading to a decline in the interest rate of B-bonds. As a result, a spread will arise between 
the interest rates of A-bonds and B-bonds, reflecting the default risk implicit in holding A-
bonds (we assume that B-bonds are free of default risk).  
 
We obtain 
    rA = rB +               (8) 
where  is the spread reflecting the default risk of A-bonds. 18 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
We analyze the effects of this shock in Figure A2. As a result of the sovereign debt shock, the 
interest  rate  is  pushed up  in  country  A,  while it  is pushed  down  in  country  B,  so  as  to 
produce  the  spread  .  There  are  many  ways  in  which  this  shock  can  affect  the  money 
markets  in  the  two  countries,  depending  on  how  the  monetary  authorities  react  to  this 
shock.3 In Figure A2, we show a symmetric reaction.  
Figure A2. Effect of sovereign debt shock in a symmetric system 
 
The increase in the spread has two effects in country A. First, the higher interest rate leads to 
a reduction of the demand for money in country A. This is the demand effect. There is also a 
supply effect: deposit holders of country A order their banks to transfer their deposits to 
banks in country B. This triggers flows in the Target2 payment system. A-banks will draw on 
their reserves at central bank A, which will transfer these to central bank B. This will show as 
an increased liability of central bank A and an increased claim of central bank B in the Target 
system. Thus TA in equation (2) declines and TB in equation (5) increases. This has the effect 
of reducing the money supply in country A (shown by the leftward shift of the MA curve) 
and of increasing the money supply in country B (a rightward shift of the MB line). These 
shifts will be such that the spread  is maintained producing a higher interest rate in country 
A and a lower one in country B.  
Thus, in this symmetric system, there will be a contraction of the money stock in country A 
and an expansion in country B. The total money stock, however, remains unchanged. Thus 
in such a system the changes in Target claims and liabilities offset each other and keep the 
money stock in the union unchanged.  
We  note  an  important  phenomenon.  An  expectation  that  country  A’s  government  may 
experience payment difficulties has a double effect: it increases the interest rate in country A 
and  it  increases  the  Target  liabilities  of  country  A’s  central  bank.  The  opposite  occurs  in 
country B where the interest rate declines and the central bank acquires more Target claims. 
The  changes  in  both  variables,  interest  rate  and  Target2  flows  are  therefore  occurring 
simultaneously. It cannot be said that one causes the other.4  
                                                   
3 This has to do with the n-1 problem analyzed in De Grauwe (2009).  
4 In a recent paper Steinkamp & Westermann (2012) claimed that this is the case, i.e. that the Target 
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Note also that the mechanism we have described in Figure A2 is the same mechanism that 
occurs in a fixed exchange rate system when speculators expect a devaluation of currency A. 
In that case a spread in the interest rates of the two countries occurs reflecting the expected 
future devaluation. In addition, central bank A loses international reserves and central bank 
B  accumulates  international  reserves.  The  monetary  effects  obtained  under  such  a  fixed 
exchange  rate  system  are  the  same  as  those  obtained  here  in  a  monetary  union  after  a 
sovereign debt shock (see De Grauwe, 2009, chapter 6). 
Figure  A2  describes  a  symmetric  monetary  adjustment  mechanism.  It  is  unlikely  that 
symmetry  will  prevail  –  very  much  like  symmetry  usually  did  not  prevail  in  a  fixed 
exchange rate system because the leader (hegemon) of the system would fix its money stock 
independently.  There  are  two  potential  sources  of  asymmetry  in  the  monetary  union 
analyzed here. One arises from the liquidity problems experienced by the banks in country 
A;  the  other  from  the  existence  of  a  liquidity  trap.  Let  us  analyze  these  two  features 
consecutively.  
Asymmetry due to liquidity problems 
We have seen that after the sovereign debt crisis there is an outflow of deposits from country 
A to country B. This shows up as an accumulation of Target2 liabilities of central bank A and 
of Target2 claims of central bank B. Underlying these movements, however, is the transfer of 
reserves held by banks in country A to the banks in country B. The effect of this transfer is 
that banks in country A experience a decline in their liquid reserves (these are deposits at the 
central bank). In fact if the deposit flows are large, the banks in country A will not have 
enough  reserves  to  make  the  transfer  possible.  They  will  have  to  borrow  reserves  from 
central bank A. Let us take the extreme view and assume that banks in country A had no 
reserves at all to start with. In order to make the transfer of reserves to the banks in country 
B possible, central bank A will lend these to the banks in country A. It does this by extending 
a loan backed by collateral. In equation (2) DA increases. We show the effects of this lending 
policy (which is also called ‘sterilization policies’) in Figure A3. We assume that the increase 
in DA exactly offsets the decline in TA. In that case the money stock in country A returns to its 
pre-crisis level. The effect of this on country B is now dramatic. Country B must accept that 
its money stock increases sufficiently so as to produce a drop in the interest rate that is high 
enough to keep the spread equal to .  
The net effect of this asymmetric system is that the money stock in the system as a whole 
increases. Thus, this asymmetry can potentially have an inflationary effect in the monetary 
union.  This  feature  is  at  the  core  of  the  complaint  that  has  been  formulated  by  Sinn  & 
Wollmershäuser (2012).5 
Note also that the outcome described in Figure A3 assumes that the central bank of country 
B does not apply similar sterilization policies. It could do this by restricting credit to banks in 
country B, which as a result of the deposit flow have accumulated large amounts of reserves. 
But we can immediately see from Figure A3 that both countries cannot at the same time 
apply such sterilization policies. The latter would imply that the money supplies remain at 
their pre-crisis levels in both countries. Thus, the interest rates would be the same, but that is 
impossible  because  there  exists  a  spread   between  these  interest  rates.  One  of  the  two 
central banks must accept to follow the other.  
                                                   
5 In the European Monetary System it was the reverse. The Bundesbank (the central bank of country 
B) then independently set its money stock. Then when country A experienced a speculative crisis 
(investors expected a devaluation), the spread would appear as an increase in the interest rate and a 
monetary contraction in country A. Country B’s (Germany) money stock and interest rate could then 
remain unchanged. There was a deflationary bias (see De Grauwe, 2009).  20 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Figure A3. Effect of sovereign debt shock in an asymmetric system 
Asymmetry due to liquidity trap 
In the previous section we saw that the need to avoid a liquidity crisis in the banking system 
of country A leads to an asymmetric outcome, leading to a potentially inflationary risk. How 
serious is this threat? The answer has to do with a second potential source of asymmetry, i.e. 
the existence of a liquidity trap. In the scenario developed in the previous sections, we have 
seen that the as a result of the sovereign debt crisis in country A, the interest rate in country 
B is pushed downwards. There is a limit though to this downward movement. When the 
interest rate is low enough, further downward movements are prevented as a result of the 
liquidity trap. We show this case in Figure A4. We assume that the interest rate in country B 
has  declined  so  much  that  it  has  reached  the  horizontal  segment  of  the  money  demand 
curve. The figure illustrates what the effects then are of the sovereign debt crisis in country 
A. We now observe that the interest rate decline in country B is limited. As a result, the 
interest rate in country A must increase more than in the symmetric case. There is nothing 
the central bank of country A can do about this. Sterilization policies will not help to avoid 
the upward movement in the interest rate in country A. Note also that the inflationary effect 
in this system is mitigated as country A will have to accept a decline in its money stock.  
Figure A4. Effect of sovereign debt shock with liquidity trap 
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APPENDIX B 
Table A1. Unit root test (H0 hypothesis: Panel contains unit root) 
Variable  LLC test: 
 p-value 
Breitung test: 
 p-value 
IPS test:  
p-value 
Target2 GDP ratio  1.0000  0.9999  1.0000 
Debt GDP ratio  1.0000  0.9961  1.0000 
Accumulated current account GDP ratio  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Interest rate  0.9998  0.6609  0.9971 
Real effective exchange rate  0.0001  0.2787  0.0000 
Growth rate  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Accumulated trade imbalance GDP ratio  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
∆(Target2 GDP ratio)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
∆(Debt GDP ratio)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
∆(Accumulated  current  account  GDP 
ratio) 
0.0000  0.0002  0.0000 
∆(Interest rate)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
∆(Real effective exchange rate)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
∆(Growth rate)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
∆  (Accumulated  trade  imbalance  GDP 
ratio) 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
 Table A2. Cointegration test (H0 hypothesis: no cointegration) 
Level regression  First-difference regression 
Total sample  Total sample  Pre-crisis sample  Post-crisis sample 
Cannot reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value = 0.4031) 
 
Cannot reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value=0.1947) 
Reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value=0.0000) 
Reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-alue=0.0373) 
 
 
Table A3. Cointegration test (Trade imbalance regression, H0 hypothesis: no cointegration) 
Level regression  First-difference regression 
Total sample  Total sample  Pre-crisis sample  Post-crisis sample 
Cannot reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value = 0.4949) 
 
Cannot reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value= 0.0250) 
Reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-value=0.0004) 
Reject “no 
cointegration” 
(p-alue= 0.0815) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Figure A5. Trade imbalance GDP ratio in eurozone countries 
 
Data sources: Datastream (IMF Direction of Trade data) and authors’ own calculations. 
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